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“Nothing is more foolish than to swear 
by the fact that the Greeks had an 
autochthonous culture, rather, they 
absorbed all the culture flourishing 
among other nations, and they advanced 
so far just because they understood how 
to hurl the spear further from the very 
spot where another nation had let it 
rest”.  
– Friedrich Nietzsche (KSA: 1.806)2 
 
 
Phenomenology is one of the most influential philosophical 
traditions of contemporary philosophy. Alongside with post-
structuralism, post-modernism and critical theory, 
phenomenology constitutes one of the key strands of the broadly 
conceived Continental philosophy. It has influenced such 
versatile traditions as philosophical hermeneutics and 
existentialism, and it is often employed in fields of cultural 
studies, comparative literature, archeology, and the cognitive 
sciences. Although phenomenology is often defined through its 
attachment to the first-person perspective, it has also become a 
central tradition in the fields of social ontology and political 
philosophy (see e.g. Zahavi 2001; Miettinen 2014b). 
 
Phenomenology originated with the work of the German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). In his early 
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philosophical work Logical Investigations (1900–1901) Husserl 
introduced phenomenology as a method of investigating 
different forms of meaning in relation to their experiential 
“givenness”. Husserl developed this idea into a theory of 
intentional acts as the foundation of all meaning – real and ideal, 
natural and cultural – and reformulated many of the central 
notions of modern transcendental philosophy to acknowledge 
the fundamental role of experience in our relation to the world. 
Although Husserl’s vocabulary from the 1910s onwards followed 
Cartesian and Kantian traditions, he presented a rather unique 
theory of the transcendental subject as a temporally developing 
person and emphasized the role of others in its constitution. 
Husserl called this approach “genetic phenomenology” in 
distinction from his earlier, “static” analyses. (Husserl 1973a: 34–
43. See also Husserl 1973b: 613ff. See also Steinbock 1998) 
 
Although Husserl’s phenomenology began as a fundamentally 
theoretical project with a rather heavy emphasis on the 
individual, his work was by no means indifferent towards topics 
of ethics and community. Especially since the 1920s onwards, 
Husserl frequently discussed questions of normativity and 
intersubjectivity, and began to develop a phenomenology of 
generativity (Generativität) that focused on questions of historical 
and intergenerational forms of meaning-constitution. (Husserl 
1976: 190–192; Husserl 1992: 399, 424–426) The emergence of the 
well-known concept of the life-world (Lebenswelt) in Husserl’s 
later works was a result of these analyses. In his late work The 
Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1992 [1936]), the life-world served as the fundamental and 
necessary point of departure for the phenomenological method. 
Phenomenology, in this sense, could no longer be exercised in 
the manner of Cartesian self-reflection but by examining the 
historically given prejudices and presuppositions.  
 
The concept or idea of Europe played a double role in this 
development – and in Husserl’s work in general. First, the 
political situation of Europe after the First World War provided a 
central impetus for the rethinking of phenomenology and the 
introduction of the themes of ethics, community and history. 
Phenomenology, in Husserl’s view, could no longer remain a 
purely theoretical endeavor but was to provide a new foundation 
for the rearticulation of ethical humanity. (Husserl 1976: 59) 
Second, Europe itself became a central topic of investigation 
through which Husserl analyzed the historical or generative 
development of philosophy and its implications for the social 
sphere: What is the relation of philosophy to culture, history and 
politics? How does philosophy transform culture? Is philosophy 
itself based on cultural or geopolitical events? In order to do this, 
Husserl returned to the origins of European science in Ancient 
Greece. 
 
Husserl’s Europe, however, was not simply a particular entity. In 
a letter to Emanuel Radl in 1934, Husserl made a distinction 
between “empirical Europe” and Europe “in the spiritual sense” 
that was to be understood as a task. Europe, as Husserl 
understood it, denoted not only the realized history of a 
particular continent, but a more specific idea of cultural 
development animated by philosophical reason. (Husserl 1988: 
241) Especially after the First World War, Husserl began to 
reflect upon what he considered as the cosmopolitan and 
universalistic calling of philosophical reason. In particular, 
Husserl wanted to preserve what he understood as the original 
motive of Western rationality, namely, its search for evidence 
and absolute foundations in the spirit of the theoretical attitude. 
This is not to say that the whole of European history would have 
followed this search for absolute foundations, but that the 
principle of universalism was indeed constitutive for its central 
accomplishments. 
 
It should be emphasized, however, that this interpretation of 
Husserl as a universalist and a cosmopolitan is somewhat 
selective in that it disregards some of his earlier, more nationalist 
ideas. Particularly during the First World War, Husserl seemed 
like a typical German intellectual who wrote about Fichtean 
ideals of national liberation and the idea of “sacred war” 
(Husserl 1994: 402). “Death has again won back its holy primal 
right”, Husserl remarked quite enthusiastically in his lectures on 
Fichte in 1917, “It is again the great reminder of eternity in time.” 
(Husserl 1995: 112) As Karl Schuhmann has argued in Husserls 
Staatsphilosophie (1988), Husserl’s relation to the problem of 
political community was at the end highly ambiguous. In 
contrast to his war-time ideas of nation and liberation, the 1920s 
marked a shift towards Kantian republicanism or what almost 
seems like a mixture of Stoic cosmopolitanism and socialist 
internationalism. In his post-WWI essays, Husserl began to use 
concepts such as Übervolk and Übernation in connection to what 
he called a “communistic unity of will” (Husserl 1988: 53). The 
emergence of Europe as a supranational unity of peoples was 
linked to this shift of position. 
 
This article is divided into three parts. The first part introduces 
the topic of Europe in relation to Husserl’s well-known concept 
of the crisis. Husserl did not invent this topical notion but 
formulated its key premises anew in order to analyze the specific 
dispersion of modern scientific reason. Instead of passive 
submissiveness, the crisis was to be understood as a positive call 
for action and as an indispensable tool of Husserl’s teleological-
historical reflections. The second part focuses on what Husserl 
considered as the origin of his idea of Europe, that is, the birth of 
philosophy in Ancient Greece. What interests us here is how 
Husserl analyzed the transformatory role of philosophy in 
regard to culture. Philosophy, according to this view, was not a 
matter of the individual but contained within itself a cultural and 
historical dimension; it was born out of the insistence to 
overcome the natural limits of one’s own “homeworld”. 
Philosophy itself was a geopolitical event that laid out a 
completely new type of horizon for the development of culture. 
The third part focuses on the political consequences of this idea. 
While philosophy emerged from the close interconnectedness of 
Greek city-states, it was also able to formulate a new 
understanding of the political community.  
 
Philosophy and the European Crisis 
 
Husserl’s reflections on Europe took their point of departure 
from the idea of crisis. Especially in his works of the 1930s, 
Husserl spoke frequently of the crisis of “European humanity”, 
of “European sciences” and also simply about the “crisis of 
Europe” (Buckley 1992; Moran 2000). This crisis was to be 
understood in two regards. First, it referred to the decline of 
European culture and values that followed the profound 
destruction of the First World War. In these years it was 
particularly the concept of crisis that became one of the central 
symbols to describe the sense of an acute turning point, the loss 
of foundations, or even an irreversible demise of the European 
culture. Husserl himself experienced this crisis on both 
professional as well as personal level – he lost his son Wolfgang 
on the battlefields of Verdun in 1916 – and was later 
academically isolated as the National Socialists came into power 
in 1933.  
 
This crisis, however, was not purely a series of institutional 
setbacks but a deeper loss of meaning that concerned the very 
foundations of phenomenology. As Husserl wrote in a letter to 
Fritz Kaufmann: “Because of it [the inception of the First World 
War] I lost the continuity of my scientific thread of life, and if I 
cannot work productively, understand myself, to read my 
manuscripts but without bringing them to intuition, then I am 
badly off.” (Husserl 1994: 340) Husserl seemed to be referring not 
only to scientific ideas but also his wartime reflections on the 
historical task of the German nation. In any case, the task of 
phenomenology was no longer simply to provide an ontological 
or epistemological foundation for the sciences. It was to strive 
towards a more comprehensive “rational reform of community”. 
(Husserl 1988: 5) The idea of Europe played a key role in this. 
 
Secondly, Husserl employed the notion of crisis also in a more 
limited sense to describe a deep dissatisfaction in the 
development of modern science. (Husserl 1976: 20-41) Especially 
through Galileo’s discoveries, mathematical reasoning became 
the central model of all scientific rationality, and the natural 
sciences gained a prominent position as the basic paradigm of all 
science. The dominance of a particular type of rationality – the 
mathematical and the natural-scientific – led to a gradual 
dissolution of the natural and the human sciences, and a general 
confusion concerning the unity of sciences. Human sciences such 
as psychology, anthropology or history with their interpretative 
methods were seen as being primarily subjective or lacking the 
hard objectivity of exact sciences.  
 
This “hostility towards the spirit” (Geistfeindschaft), as Husserl 
called it, had significant normative implications. (Husserl 1976: 
347) Scientific reason became gradually irrelevant for questions 
of good life and politics. Science dissociated itself from ethics or 
morality, which could no longer be interpreted as having any 
objective validity, but rather, they were seen as being first and 
foremost subjective apprehensions on how things should be. On 
a more general level, the natural-scientific revolution with its 
belief in the deterministic character of the world had 
undermined the fundamental “faith in the freedom of the human 
being.” (Husserl 1976: 11) In Husserl’s view, what Europe lost 
was indeed the faith in the idea of reason as a source of human 
renewal and science as the moral compass of humanity.  
 
The crisis of Europe was a crisis of philosophy, though not in the 
narrow sense of particular theories or individual ideas. Instead, it 
was a crisis of a particular vision of philosophy as the “spiritual 
organ” of humanity. (Husserl 1988: 54)  
 
How should we understand this expression? Europe, for 
Husserl, was primarily a culture of scientific reason. This did not 
mean that the history of Europe would have been all about 
scientific discoveries but in the sense that scientific rationality 
was in fact constitutive for culture as such (see Gasché 2009: 
21ff.). The idea of science born in Ancient Greece was not simply 
one branch of culture among others – art, technology, religion 
etc. – but something that animated the whole development of 
culture. For instance, it was exactly science or scientific 
rationality that enabled Christianity to constitute itself as a 
theology with its fundamental truths and axioms. What 
philosophy introduced was not simply a method of observation 
but a practical task that strove to ground the development of 
culture in rational insight. This was not to say that the whole of 
European history from colonialism and imperialism to 
industrialized capitalism could be described as a simple triumph 
of reason, but rather that this tendency towards systematization 
was an underlying feature of the European culture.  
 
This meant that the ongoing crisis of the European sciences and 
reason could only be understood and addressed by returning to 
the origins of Europe, that is, to the birth of science and 
philosophy in Ancient Greece. In line with his late method of 
“teleological-historical reflection” Husserl called this event the 
“teleological beginning [and] the true birth of the European 
spirit.” (Husserl 1976: 72) It is crucial to note that the concept of 
teleology did not entail any kind of historical determinism, but a 
method of inspection directed at the historical descending of 
ideas. To understand the present as teleological means that it is 
not absolute but rather depends on a series of acts that 
fundamentally define our possibilities of thinking and acting. 
Unlike in the Hegelian sense, for Husserl the teleological-
historical method did not aim at a justification of the present but 
at “liberation” (Befreiung) (Cf. Husserl 1976: 60). It is only 
through a comprehensive account of the past that one is able to 
have a grasp of those ideas and presuppositions that define the 
present moment and limit our possibilities.  
 
In this regard, Husserl’s discourse on the crisis differed rather 
substantially from many of the dark visions of his own time. 
Unlike for Oswald Spengler (1991), for instance, the crisis of 
Europe was not a sign of the irreversible “decline of the West” 
but rather a call for action that motivates itself from the 
fundamental loss of meaning. The “crisis of European existence”, 
Husserl wrote, “is not an obscure fate nor an impenetrable 
destiny. Instead, it becomes manifestly understandable against 
the background of the philosophically discoverable teleology of 
European history.” (Husserl 1976: 348) 
 
[This crisis of Europe] has only two possible 
outcomes: either the ruin of a Europe alienated from 
its rational sense of life, fallen into barbarian hatred 
of spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of 
philosophy, through the heroism of reason that will 
definitively overcome naturalism. (Husserl 1976: 
348) 
 
Judging from today’s perspective, it might be concluded that 
Husserl’s analysis on the clear-cut choice between “barbarian 
hatred of spirit” and the “heroism of reason” was indeed a kind 
of hyperbole that exaggerated the possibilities of philosophy to 
decide on the course of culture. Although the 10 years that 
followed this statement from 1935 were absolutely decisive for 
European societies, it might be said that this period did not 
resolve the fundamental philosophical conflict between 
phenomenology and naturalism. Instead, Husserl himself 
seemed to fall victim to a kind of “heroization of the present” 
that Michel Foucault (1984: 34) once defined as the basic logic of 
crisis. 
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that for Husserl, the use of the concept 
of crisis in regard to the problem of Europe was not a dark 
prophecy of an irreversible destruction. Instead, the crisis served 
as a call for action in hope of a better future. This entailed, 
however, that the current crisis of European rationality was to be 
“uprooted” (entwurzeln) by returning to its origins (Husserl 1976: 
317). These origins, in Husserl’s view were to be found in the 
Classical period of Ancient Greece: 
 
Spiritual Europe has a birthplace. By this I mean not 
a geographical birthplace, in one land, though this is 
also true, but rather a spiritual birthplace in a nation 
or in individual men and human groups of this 
nation. It is the ancient Greek nation in the seventh 
and sixth centuries BC. Here there arises a new sort 
of attitude of individuals toward their surrounding 
world. And its consequence is the breakthrough of a 
completely new sort of spiritual structure, rapidly 
growing into a systematically self-enclosed cultural 
form; the Greeks called it philosophy. (Husserl 1976: 
321)  
 
This return, however, was not to be understood in terms of 
romanticized nostalgia. Although the Greeks conceived 
philosophy in terms of a rational life that strives towards best 
possible evidence, they were in many ways unable to live up to 
this ideal. Despite its demand for universality, Greek philosophy 
was defined by a number of naturalistic or traditional prejudices. 
Plato founded his ideal polis on a questionable division between 
producers, soldiers and rulers that had its origin in nature; 
Aristotle excluded both women and slaves from the full sense of 
reason (logos). What the Greeks articulated, however, was an 
understanding of philosophy that was not simply limited to the 
sphere of individual consciousness. As Husserl put it, 
philosophy was a spiritual structure that articulated itself as a 
“cultural form” (1976: 321). Its birth was closely tied to the 
existence of a variety of cultural contexts, competing political 
systems and worldviews. Instead of one ruling hegemon, 
philosophy started from plurality, and it was particularly this 
feature that provided the key for the overcoming of the 
European crisis.  
 
Greek Philosophy and the Birth of Europe 
 
Husserl’s reflections on Greek philosophy were based on two 
competing ideas. First, Husserl understood philosophy as arising 
from the general geo-political and geo-historical situation of the 
Greek city-states at the wake of the Classical era (see. e.g. Held 
1989; 2002). Those forms of thinking we call philosophical 
emerged against the backdrop of a series of political, societal and 
religious transformations in the 6th century BC and they 
fundamentally changed the cultural landscape of Greek societies. 
Rapid economic development and maritime trade led to new 
cultural interchange as well as growing tensions between social 
classes. Solon’s constitutional reforms of the early 6th century 
aimed at resolving some of these tensions and provided the 
institutional setting for the emergence of Athenian democracy. 
As Athenian citizenship was extended also to non-indigenous 
people, Athens became the center of commercial and cultural 
exchange (See e.g. Andrews 1967: 197ff.).  Thus, the birth of 
philosophy was inherently tied to the abundance of different 
cultures, world-views, ideas and practices: 
 
Naturally the outbreak of the theoretical attitude, like 
everything that develops historically, has its factual 
motivation in the concrete framework of historical 
occurrence. In this respect one must clarify, then, how 
thaumazein (wonder) could arise and become habitual, at 
first in individuals, out of the manner and the life-
horizon of Greek humanity in the seventh century, with 
its contact with the great and already highly cultivated 
nations of its surrounding world. (Husserl 1976: 331-332) 
 
As Husserl emphasized especially in his later works, the 
Platonic-Aristotelian model of philosophizing was not a matter 
of purely personal endeavor. Rather, philosophy emerged as a 
form of communal activity, a philosophizing-together, that was 
inextricably tied to the multitude of perspectives. (Husserl 1976: 
326) Philosophy was not born ex nihilo but was “motivated by the 
pre-philosophical lifeworld.” (Husserl 1992: 347) As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994: 88) once put it, the geopolitical situation of the 
Greek city-states was in fact defined by the absence of a 
hegemonic empire that provided “a taste for the exchange of 
views.” Moreover, the Athenian society with its institutionalized 
forms of public debate provided a fertile ground for the 
emergence of philosophical debate. 
 
Secondly, philosophy itself was by no means indifferent with 
regard to historical, cultural and geo-political transformations. 
Philosophy also articulated itself as a transformation in the social 
and political sphere. This did not only mean that philosophy 
expressed itself in the form of a political program – a set of 
institutional demands as in the case of Plato’s Republic – but that 
philosophy enabled a completely new type of communal 
imagination. “Under the title of philosophy”, Husserl wrote, “is 
the idea of rigorous science out of free reason the overarching 
and all-embracing idea of culture.” (1988: 89) Besides being a 
specific attitude of an individual, philosophy gave way to a new 
type of “political historicity” (politische Geschichtlichkeit) (1992: 15) 
that fundamentally transformed the temporal and geo-political 
imagination of a particular community.  
 
This effect of philosophical reason can be described with the 
concept of universalism that can be understood in two senses. 
First, Greek philosophy was universal in its insistence to 
“bracket” or suspend the validity all particular cultural 
perspectives. Unlike other cultural practices that defined 
themselves according to unique cultural features such as 
Etruscan pottery or Doric architecture, philosophy laid out a 
field of study – the totality of beings and their most general 
categories and features – that was essentially one and the same 
despite changing cultural contexts. As Aristotle put it in his 
Metaphysics, a philosopher must advance from the position that 
different thinkers, despite changing vocabularies, actually speak 
about the same matters. (Aristotle Met. I.5, 987a10–11) No single 
language or culture has an advantage in regard to the basic task 
of philosophy. 
 
Since 1920s onwards Husserl developed this idea of cultural 
contexts into a comprehensive theory of different “normative” 
frameworks. He did this with the concepts of “home” and the 
“alien” and the respective notions of “homeworld” and 
“alienworld” that described the basic experience of familiarity 
characteristic of the lifeworld (Steinbock 1995: 173ff.; Waldenfels 
1998). The concept of the homeworld was to be understood in 
terms of a shared cultural territory (Kulturterritorium) which 
involves a consciousness of its uniqueness with regard to its 
outside. As Husserl insisted, “home and alien designate a 
difference in understanding” (1992: 42) – the familiarity of a 
particular lifeworld is based on its intelligible character, which is 
always delimited in regard to that which is unintelligible, that 
which is unfamiliar and strange. Instead of a merely contingent 
feature, the division between home and alien was actually a 
“permanent structure of every world” (1973b: 431). 
 
Philosophy was an event deeply tied to a transformation of the 
homeworld. In Husserl’s view, philosophy emerged from the 
observation that no single culture has an advantage when it 
comes to questions of the real world. In an essay “Teleology in 
the History of Philosophy” (Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte), 
Husserl emphasized the centrality of the critique of mythology to 
the emergence of the theoretical attitude. “The Greeks were keen 
to despise the barbarians”, Husserl wrote, “the alien mythologies 
that signified such an important dimension of the practical 
environment in the alien as well as in the own people, and [they] 
considered them even as barbaric, stupid, or profoundly wrong.” 
(1992: 387). According to a popular etymological consideration, 
the Greek word ‘barbaroi’ was derived from the seemingly 
incomprehensible speech of alien people (e.g. the Persians). See 
e.g. Waldenfels 1997: 22) However, even the mockery and 
ridicule that the Greeks leveled at foreign mythologies failed to 
remove the Greeks fascination for their similarities and 
analogous ways of seeing the world, “the same sun, the same 
moon, the same earth, the same sea etc.” (1992: 387) Alongside 
the “territorial myths” characteristic of particular homeworlds – 
for instance, the tales of Philomela and Oedipus among the 
Greeks – there emerged a novel sensitivity towards “universal 
myths” that referred to universally shared features of the 
lifeworld such as the earth, the sky and the heavenly bodies. 
(1992: 43–44) 
 
Secondly, philosophy was also universal in the sense that it 
addressed all rational subjects despite their cultural, ethnic or 
social origins. Philosophy idealized the very notion of 
community as it delineated an idea of a human collective that 
was not limited to a particular historical community. This 
“supraspatial and supratemporal sociality” (Husserl 1992: 395) 
was thus universal in a new, emphatic sense: it was potentially 
inclusive of all rational beings, including those who had yet to be 
born. In contrast to “political” communities, which relied on the 
difference between friend and enemy, the philosophical 
community knew only friends. Its defining characteristic was a 
fundamental openness towards not only all living human beings 
but also towards future generations. 
 
Philosophy realized this universalistic calling by imagining a 
completely new type of cultural objects: ideas. From early on, 
Husserl resisted a typical interpretation of Platonic idealism as a 
theory of another world and followed Herrmann Lotze’s insights 
on validity and normativity: for Plato, Husserl argued, “ideas 
were taken as archetypes, in which everything singular 
participates more or less ‘ideally,’ which everything approaches, 
which everything realizes more or less fully; the ideal truths 
belonging to the ideas were taken as the absolute norms for all 
empirical truths.” (Husserl 1976: 291) Especially practical ideas 
such as “the state” or “the human being” were understood as 
normative models that can only be approximated and 
approached in concrete action. Unlike the accomplishments of 
everyday practices, ideas were not exhausted in the course of 
worldly time; rather, they were able to surpass the perishability 
of the real world. 
 
From a generative perspective, the emergence of theoretical 
ideality brought about not only a new class of cultural objects but 
also a completely new horizon of production.  In contrast to the 
kinds of worldly practices where different projects and goals 
follow one another in temporal succession, the theoretical 
attitude gave birth to a class of ideal goals that can never be fully 
attained in concrete action. Conceived of as a universal task that 
deals with the totality of beings, philosophy disclosed an area of 
pure idealities and infinite horizons where each every single 
truth is only given a relative status in respect to the complete 
task.  
 
Unlike the accomplishments of everyday practices, the products 
of theory were not exhausted in the course of worldly time; 
rather, they were able to surpass the perishability of the real 
world. In other words, theory opened up a completely new level 
in the intergenerational constitution of meaning which was able 
to remain unchanged despite the historical and cultural 
circumstances, for the theoretical attitude “produces in any 
number of acts of production by one person or any number of 
persons something identically the same, identical in sense and 
validity.” (Husserl 1976: 323) Historical periodization was no 
longer conceived of an obstacle to the identical transmission of 
sense, because the universal tradition of philosophy was able to 
function as the absolute plane of perpetual creation of sense. This 
was what Husserl called the revolutionary effect of science and 
philosophy: 
 
Scientific culture under the guidance of ideas of 
infinity means, then, a revolutionization 
[Revolutionierung] of the whole culture, a 
revolutionization in the very manner in which 
humanity creates culture. (Husserl 1976: 325. 
Translation modified. On this point, see also 
Schuhmann 1988: 159ff.) 
 
This revolution is perhaps best understood through Husserl’s 
repeated definition of philosophy as an “infinite task” (unendliche 
Aufgabe), a concept that Husserl adopted from the neo-Kantians. 
(Husserl 1976: 72, 324, 336ff.; Husserl 1992: 408, 421) Instead of a 
simple “doctrine” (Lehre) that could be passed on to new 
generations, philosophy introduced the idea of cultural 
accomplishment in the form of a formal project that could not be 
simply rendered in the form of substantive content. Philosophy, 
which was itself born out of the relativization of all traditions, 
did not simply replace the traditionality of the pre-philosophical 
world by instituting a new tradition; rather, it replaced the very 
idea of traditionality with a new kind of teleological directedness or 
“teleological sense” (Zwecksinn) that remains fundamentally 
identical despite historical variation. (Husserl 1992: 34) This 
universal teleology does not recognize any physical borders: it 
invites everyone to fulfill its goals.  
 
The intrinsic corollary of this singularity was of course the 
essential sharedness of philosophical accomplishments. Although 
theoretical insights can be classified according to their origin, as 
in the case of the Pythagorean Theorem, due to their purely ideal 
character, the products of theory cannot be possessed by anyone. 
In one of his Kaizo essays, Husserl actually described the 
philosophical community as fundamentally communistic. 
(Husserl 1988: 90, 377) Theory, as a form of production, was not 
only critical towards all imperialistic constellations based on a 
central will; it also revealed a field of accomplishments that was 
common to all.  
 
Unlike all other cultural works, philosophy is not a 
movement of interest which is bound to the soil of 
the national tradition. Aliens, too, learn to 
understand it and generally take part in the immense 
cultural transformation which radiates out from 
philosophy. […] philosophy, which has grown up 
out of the universal critical attitude toward anything 
and everything pre-given in the tradition, is not 
inhibited in its spread by any national boundaries 
(Schranken). (Husserl 1976: 333–335) 
 
It is exactly here that we are able to comprehend the cultural and 
geopolitical transformation that philosophy produced. 
Philosophy, through the infinite horizon of ideal truths, was able 
to articulate itself in the new forms of historicity and generativity. 
By understanding itself in regard to a horizon of production 
which is absolutely singular, philosophy was able to project the 
idea of universal historicity – a temporal horizon which is 
absolutely singular and which is not exhausted in the course of 
worldly time. This is what Husserl meant with his idea of 
Europe: On the basis of the new idea of sharedness, philosophy 
gave rise to a novel form of territorial universalism that was 
willing to overcome all generative divisions between home and 
alien, i.e., it was a movement that was willing to transcend all 
cultural limits. As Novalis once put it, it was “the desire to be 
everywhere at home.” (Novalis 1993 [1798]: 434 (fr. no. 857). 
 
Europe and Political universalism 
 
Understood against the background of the birth of philosophy, 
Husserl’s idea of Europe was a prospect of a political community 
that would go beyond the traditional ideas of nation and state, an 
idea of community inherently critical towards all pre-established 
limits of culture or ethnicity. Motivated by the generative 
transformation in the categories of “homeworld” and 
“alienworld”, philosophy aimed at articulating a novel idea of 
political communality that was inherently critical towards all 
natural divisions of familiarity and strangeness. For Husserl, the 
essential transitivity and contingency of these divisions was 
indeed the most important lesson of the political history of 
Europe: 
 
Yet this essential difference between homeliness and 
alienness (Heimatlichkeit und Fremdheit), a fundamental 
category of all historicity that relativizes itself in many 
strata, cannot suffice. Historical mankind does not 
always divide itself up in the same way in accord with 
this category. We feel this precisely in our own Europe. 
There is something unique here that is recognized in us 
by all other human groups, too, something that, quite 
apart from all considerations of utility, becomes a 
motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their 
unbroken will to spiritual self-preservation […]. 
(Husserl 1976: 320) 
 
What Husserl described here was a process we would perhaps 
nowadays call globalization, that is, the dissolution of cultural 
limits. Indeed, from Hellenistic cosmopolitanism to Catholic 
universalism, from medieval crusades to modern imperialism, 
the will to overcome cultural and ethnic limits has been an 
integral part of European history (see Miettinen 2014a). Europe 
has not simply accepted existing limits between home and alien, 
but it has worked towards their dissolution with both ideas as 
well as by force. Here, Husserl’s description of the will of non-
Europeans to “Europeanize themselves” was of course naïve and 
historically misrepresenting: while “European” ideas and 
institutions have been taken up by others, this has obviously not 
been a harmonious process. Indeed, in the preface to the Crisis, 
Husserl did in fact speak of the “historical non-sense” of the 
actually existing Europeanization that seemed to refer to the 
perverted forms of European universalism (1992: 14, see also 
Gasché 2009: 47).  
 
Still, Husserl was willing to defend the argument according to 
which the birth of philosophical reason entailed a transgression 
not only in the European context but in the framework of 
universal history: 
 
This means nothing less than that we grant to European 
culture […] not just the highest position relative to all 
historical cultures but rather we see in it the first 
realization of an absolute norm of development, one that is 
called to the task of revolutionizing all other cultures in 
the process of development. (Husserl 1988: 73) 
 
It is quite understandable that one might read passages like this 
as simple justifications of the violent expansionism of the 
European culture. This has been the interpretation, for instance, 
of Jacques Derrida who has paid attention to the “logic of 
exemplarity” in traditional discourses on Europe. Although 
Derrida formulates his criticism in several of his works – from 
the early works on Husserl’s genesis to the later reflections on 
the state of Europe (L’autre cap) – the content of this criticism has 
remained the same in essence: “Europe has always confused its 
image, its face […] with a heading for world civilization or 
human culture in general.” (Derrida 1992: 24) Against this logic, 
Derrida argues, “it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians 
of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe 
that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity 
and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is 
not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other.” 
(Derrida 1992: 29) 
 
Derrida’s criticism, I believe, has its own justification. As I would 
like to argue, however, what characterized Husserl’s return to 
the Greek idea of political universalism was exactly his insistence 
to create a kind of counter-strategy to the modern tradition of 
substantial universalism. Rather than presenting us what could 
be called a universalised particularism – the assumed universal 
applicability of certain particular dogmas as in the case of 
modern theories of natural law – the Greek universalism 
provided us with a counter-motive, namely, the de-absolutization 
of all particularisms pointing towards a non-substantial account of 
culture. What Husserl considered the key insight of Greek 
political universalism was exactly the idea that the “absolute 
norm” of cultural development cannot be derived from 
empirically existing cultures; rather, it was to be located in the 
structure of human rationality as such. As Husserl put it in an 
appendix to Erste Philosophie:  
 
Philosophy emerges without a tradition in order to 
establish a tradition. […] Philosophy wants to be 
“science”, universal science of the universe; in all of 
its different systematic forms, it wants to be general 
according to the absolutely valid truth which binds 
all of those who are capable of intuitive evidence. 
(Husserl 1959: 320) 
 
Ultimately, in the midst of rising nationalistic sentiments, 
Husserl put his hope in the idea of Europe as a tradition of 
critique and renewal. The main adversary of this idea, however, 
was the idea of Europe as an actually existing history – a 
substantive account of culture only to be defended and protected 
against foreign influences. What Husserl wanted to revitalize 
was indeed the idea of Europe as a “tradition without a 
tradition”, a culture that is able to resist all particularistic 
interpretations of an exclusive heritage – or the idea that the 
foundation of culture could be located in a clearly defined notion 
of “a people”. This idea of Europe, however, was – and still is – 




This article consisted of three parts. First, I argued that the 
concept of crisis that played the central role in Husserl’s late 
reflections on Europe. Through the concept or experience of the 
crisis, Husserl rearticulated his project in order to account for the 
societal and cultural dimensions of phenomenology. Although 
the crisis itself was linked to the First World War, its origins were 
to be found in the dispersion of scientific rationality that 
characterized the whole of modernity since Galileo. The crisis of 
Europe was nothing less than the inability of cultural renewal on 
the basis of best possible evidence. Second, I showed that 
Husserl’s understanding of Europe relied on a genealogical 
analysis that traced the origins of this “cultural form” back to the 
Classical period of Ancient Greece. Instead of an individualistic 
endeavor, Husserl analyzed the birth of philosophy as a 
geopolitical event that relied on transformations in the idea of 
lifeworld. Moreover, philosophy created a completely new type 
of class of objectivities – the ideas – and visioned a never-ending 
horizon for their perpetual creation and critique. By doing so, it 
simultaneously imagined a completely new type of being 
together, that of a universal community. Finally, I discussed the 
political implications of this idea. Although Husserl rarely 
touched upon the political implications of phenomenology, his 
relation to the idea of universalism seemed to be twofold. On the 
one hand, Husserl acknowledged the original motive of political 
universalism in the dissolution of cultural limits; on the other 
hand, he treated the actually existing history of European 
universalism – the propagation of ideas and norms to other 
cultures – as fundamentally flawed. What Europe had lost was 
the fundamental element of negativity that characterized the 
original idea of universalism as the critique of all particular 
cultural frameworks. 
Thus it is possible to claim that Husserl’s reflections on Europe 
aimed at a rearticulation of the principle of universalism, but 
with regard to three central qualifications. First, the idea of 
universalism was to be understood as a fundamentally formal, 
not substantive idea. It characterized merely those general 
conditions on the basis of which we are able to understand each 
other and the world, to reach a common agreement by means of 
rational insight. Second, the idea of universalism was to be 
understood as a dynamic principle whose content is constantly 
open for rearticulation. This is why Husserl emphasized the idea 
of “infinite task” as constitutive for philosophy. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most surprisingly, Husserl understood universalism as a 
deeply pluralistic idea whose existence necessitates the co-
existence of several competing (normative) frameworks. As 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it in his late works, it was exactly 
idea of plurality that characterized – not only Husserl’s 
reflections on Europe – but his phenomenological project as a 
whole: 
Certainly nothing was more foreign to Husserl than 
a European chauvinism. For him European 
knowledge would maintain its value only by 
becoming capable of understanding what is not 
itself. What is new in the later writings is that to 
think philosophically, to be a philosopher, is no 
longer to leap from existence to essence, to depart 
from facticity in order to depart from facticity in 
order to join the idea. To think philosophically, to 
be a philosopher – in relation to the past, for 
example – is to understand this past through the 
internal link between it and us. (Merleau-Ponty 
1964: 89) 
 
Perhaps Husserl’s reflections on Europe ought to be read as an 
invitation to engage in a critical reflection with both our own 
tradition as well as what lies beyond it. Rather than being a 
defense of “European” values, ideas or norms, Husserl provides 
us with an understanding of Europe that fundamentally 
develops on the basis of plurality and openness towards the 
alien. It is an understanding of culture not as a thing or an 
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